

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND AND THE Great Central Campaign

The Important Position of Kentucky and Tennessee.

By JOHN McELROY.

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CHAPTER IV.

Gen. Sherman's "Insanity"—He is Relieved by Gen. Don Carlos Buell. Chased to Department of the Ohio. The Army Beginning to Take Shape. Victory at Mill Springs and Death of Zollicoffer.

After his repulse at Wild Cat Gap, Gen. Zollicoffer retired to Cumberland Ford, and blockaded the roads as he retreated. This indicated to Gen. Thomas and Sherman that he meditated an advance the next time by a different route, probably by Somerset, or else that he was going still farther west to join Albert Sidney Johnston in his attack upon Louisville. Therefore Gen. Sherman ordered Gen. Thomas to remain at Crab Orchard, where he would be ready to move to either Somerset or Danville, as the purpose of the enemy should develop.

All the movements of Thomas continued to be hampered by the lack of wagons, and we find a letter from Capt. A. Q. M. Dickinson, at Cincinnati, to Gen. Thomas, stating that he had begun the shipment of wagons to him but had hardly gotten under way when he received imperative orders to send 400 at once to Western Virginia, which nearly stripped him of vehicles.

Gen. Sherman's Belief. In the meanwhile the War Department became seriously disturbed as to the condition of Gen. Sherman's mind. It was not so much what he said and did officially, for this was generally based upon good military reasons, but Gen. Sherman was always a great talker, and not a little disposed, in his earlier years, to say things simply for effect. He had talked so excitedly, and it must be confessed wildly, to a number of newspaper men as to give them the impression that he was more or less unbalanced. Some of these, writing for papers of wide influence and circulation, actually asserted that he was insane. The effect of this was

crossing the river by the ferry, and drove to the Galt House, where I was then staying. Brig.-Gen. T. J. Wood had come down from Indianapolis by the early train, and was one of the party. We all proceeded to my room on the first floor of the Galt House, where our excellent landlord, Silas Miller, Esq., sent us a good lunch and something to drink. Mr. Cameron was not well, and lay on my bed, but joined in the general conversation. He and his party seemed to be full of the particulars of the developments in St. Louis of some of Fremont's extra-

was true, and he repeated what I had often heard him say, that no man who owned a slave or a mule in Kentucky could be trusted.

Mr. Cameron appeared alarmed at what was said, and turned to Adj.-Gen. L. Thomas to inquire if he knew of any troops available that had not been already assigned. He mentioned Negley's Pennsylvania Brigade at Pittsburg and a couple of other regiments that were then en route for St. Louis. Mr. Cameron ordered him to divert these to Louisville, and Thomas made the telegraphic orders on the spot. He further promised, on reaching Washington, to give us more of his time and assistance.

"In the general conversation which followed I remember taking a large map of the United States, and assuming the people of the whole South to be in rebellion, that our task was to subdue them, showed that McClellan was on the left, having a frontage of less than 100 miles; and Fremont the center, had from the Big Sandy to Paducah, over 300 miles of frontier; that McClellan had 100,000 men, Fremont 80,000, whereas to me had only been allotted about 18,000. I argued that, for the purpose of defense, we should have 60,000 men at once, and for offense would need 200,000 before we were done. Mr. Cameron, who still lay on the bed, threw up his hands, and exclaimed, 'Great God! where are they to come from?' I asked that there were plenty of men at the North,

April that the battle of Shiloh gave me personally the chance to redeem my good name."

Other Troops in Kentucky. Gen. Sherman had pushed his main campaign from Muldraugh's Hill to Nolin Creek, 52 miles from Louisville. Col. A. McDowell McCook, who had commanded a regiment at Bull Run, and was afterwards to play so prominent a part in the history of the Army of the Cumberland, had been promoted to Brigadier-General of Volunteers and ordered to report to Sherman, who assigned him to command the Nolin Creek. As the troops came in they were organized into brigades under McCook, as follows:

First Brigade—Gen. Rousseau commanding—2d Ky., Col. Bulkeley; 6th Ky., Col. Whitaker; 1st Cav., Col. Board; Stone's Battery; two companies 15th U. S.; two companies 15th U. S.; Capt. Gilman.

Second Brigade—Gen. T. J. Wood commanding—34th Ind., Col. Scribner; 38th Ind., Col. Harrison; 30th Ind., Col. Baser; 20th Ind., Col. Miller.

Third Brigade—Gen. Johnson commanding—49th Ohio, Col. Gibson; 15th Ohio, Col. Dickey; 34th Ill., Col. King; 32d Ind., Col. Walker; 1st Ohio, Col. Harris.

Fourth Brigade—Gen. Negley commanding—77th Pa., Col. Hambright; 78th Pa., Col. Sennel; 79th Pa., Col. Stoughton; 1st Ohio, Col. Mueller.

Other troops stationed elsewhere were:

Jeffersonville, Ind.—34th Ind., Col. Steele; 36th Ind., Col. Grose; 1st Wk., Col. Storkweather.

Mouth of Salt River—5th Mich., Col. Duffield; 37th Ind., Col. Hazard.

Olympian Springs—21st Ohio, Col. Harris.

Nicholasville, Ky.—21st Ohio, Col. Norton.

Colesburg—24th Ill., Col. Hecker.

Ellettsburgh, Ky.—19th Ill., Col. Turchin.

Owensboro or Henderson—31st Ind., Col. Cruft.

Buell Against the East Tennessee Campaign. From the first Gen. Buell had no sympathy with the plan of moving into East Tennessee, and courteously repelled and refused to take any interest in the suggestions of President Lincoln as to the need of such a movement. Gen. Buell was fully possessed of the idea, first advanced by Gen. Scott, that the true objective of the army was Chattanooga, and only considered operations of that line so far as they would protect his flanks and maintain the peace in Kentucky. Therefore his first orders confined Gen. Thomas to mere observation and defense. As he was to move his command to Columbia to observe any advance of the enemy along the Somerset road, leaving the 1st and 2d Tenn. and 7th Ky. under Lieut. Carter, he ordered a Tennesseean who had been appointed Brigadier-General of Volunteers, at London, to watch any possible return of Zollicoffer against the old road.

Gen. Thomas began concentrating his troops around Lebanon and Columbia. The weather was bad, the roads frightful, and the troops suffered much hardship. On Jan. 24 it was learned that Gen. Zollicoffer had reentered the State by way of Jacksonboro, Huntsville and Jamesstown, and was moving toward the Cumberland River, threatening Somerset. Gen. Thomas made prompt disposition of his troops to meet this advance, and Gen. Schoepf went forward toward Mill Springs, on the Cumberland River, where the men found a ford on the Cumberland not guarded and threw a force across. Gen. Thomas recognized that this was a distinct and dangerous menace, and strengthened Gen. Schoepf with additional regiments. Gen. Buell, however, would not believe that there was anything serious in this, and very much vexed Gen. Thomas's plans by forbidding further reinforcement of Gen. Schoepf, turning back troops that were started for that purpose. Consequently Zollicoffer was allowed to remain in a strong position on the north of the Cumberland, with a force much superior to that which was in his immediate vicinity.

The Army of the Ohio. Dec. 2 Gen. Buell announced that his forces would be termed the Army of the Ohio, and issued an order giving the brigades and division organizations. One peculiarity of this was that he numbered his brigades consecutively throughout the army, and not as divisions. The troops under Gen. Thomas constituted the First Division, and were organized as follows:

First Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Albion Schoepf commanding—33d Ind., Col. Coburn; 17th Ohio, Col. J. M. Connelley; 12th Ky., Col. W. H. Jenkins; 38th Ohio, Col. E. D. Bradley.

Second Brigade—Col. M. D. Manson commanding—4th Ky., Col. E. S. Fry; 14th Ohio, Col. B. Stensel; 3d Ind., Col. M. D. Manson; 10th Ky., Col. J. M. Harlan.

Third Brigade—Col. Robert L. McCook commanding—2d U. S., Col. H. B. Carrington; 2d Minn., Col. Van Cleave; 35th Ohio, Col. F. Vandever; 9th Ohio, Col. R. L. McCook.

Fourth Brigade—Brig.-Gen. S. P. Carter commanding—1st East Tenn., Col. R. B. Ryd; 2d East Tenn., Col. J. P. S. Carter; 7th Ky., Col. T. T. Garrard; 31st Ohio, Col. M. B. Walker.

Troops not assigned to brigades were: 1st Ky. Cav., Col. F. Wolford; Squadron Ind. Cav., Capt. Graham; Battery B, 1st Ky. Art., Capt. J. M. Hewitt; Battery C, 1st Ohio Art., Capt. W. B. Standaert; Battery C, 1st Ohio Art., Capt. D. Kinney.

Maj. W. E. Lawrence commanding artillery.

Among the troops which had been first to rendezvous at Camp Dick Robinson were those which afterwards formed that notable organization, the 1st Ky. Cav., under Col. Frank Wolford. Col. Wolford was a peculiar product of the mountain regions belonging to the class of the noted Davy Crockett. He was what the old Greeks meant by "demagogue," that is, a leader of the people, not necessarily a demagogue in our present understanding of the word, but in a better sense when a man ardently espouses what he thinks is right and then neglects no means, fair or unfair, to win victory for his cause. Wolford was as brave a man as lived, with a fine talent for that particular high-and-ready oratory which won the hearts of the mountaineers. He was what they called "a hickory lawyer and politician;" that is, a man with only moderate scholarly attainments, but brimming over with cunning, adroitness and zeal for the clients who employed him. Anything was justifiable that would win him a victory, and he had a natural amount of success. Living among those primitive people, who are naturally bright but entirely illiterate, he assumed to despise book learning and city ways, but had really more education and cultivation than he would admit. He gathered around him a fine regiment of young mountaineers, who were armed with rifles and shot, and to him and them these

DEATH OF GEN. ZOLLICOFFER AT MILL SPRINGS, KY., JAN. 19, 1862.

ready and willing to come if he would only accept their services; for it was notorious that regiments had been formed in all the Northwestern States, whose services had been refused by the War Department on the ground that they would not be needed. We discussed all these matters fully, in the most friendly spirit, and I thought I had aroused Mr. Cameron to a realization of the great war that was before us, and was, in fact, upon us. I heard him tell Gen. Thomas to make a note of our conversation, that he might attend to my requests on reaching Washington. We all spent the evening together, agreeably in conversation, many citizens calling to pay their respects, and the next morning early we took the train for Frankfort, Mr. Cameron and party going on to Cincinnati and Washington and I to Camp Dick Robinson to see Gen. Thomas and the troops there.

"About this time my attention was drawn to the publication in all the Eastern papers, which, of course, was copied at the West, of the report that I was crazy, insane and mad; that 'I had demanded 200,000 men for the defense of Kentucky,' and the authority given for this report was stated to be the Secretary of War himself, Mr. Cameron, who, never to my knowledge, took pains to affirm or deny it. My position was therefore simply unbearable, and it is probable I resented the cruel insult with language of intense feeling. Still, I received no orders, no reinforcements, not a word of encouragement or relief.

"Still, on a review of the only official documents before the War Department at the time, it was cruel to start without his wish or intention, yet through his instrumentality. Of course, I could not deny the fact, and had to submit to all its painful consequences for months; and moreover, I could not hide from myself the many of the officers and soldiers subsequently placed under my command looked at me askance and with suspicion. Indeed, it was not until the following

Kentucky plenty of men, and all they want are arms and money. I then said it was not true; for the young men were arming and going out openly in broad daylight to the rebel camps, provided with good horses and guns by their fathers, who were at best 'neutral'; and as to arms, he had, in Washington, promised Gen. Anderson 40,000 of the best Springfield muskets; instead of which we had received only about 12,000 Belgian muskets, which the Governor of Pennsylvania had refused, as had also the Governor of Ohio, which had been adjudged good enough for Kentucky. I asserted that volunteer Colonels raising regiments in various parts of the State had come to Louisville for arms, and when they saw what I had to offer had scorned to receive them—to confirm the truth of which I appealed to Mr. Guthrie, who said that every word I had spoken



GEN. GEORGE H. THOMAS.

quite prejudicial upon the Union cause in Kentucky, and therefore by General Orders, No. 57, War Department, Nov. 8, 1861, the Department of the Cumberland was discontinued, and the Department of the Ohio constituted, embracing the States of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Kentucky (east of the Cumberland River), and Tennessee, with Brig.-Gen. Don Carlos Buell in command and headquarters at Louisville. Gen. Buell assumed command Nov. 15, and Gen. Sherman went home to recover his health.

Sherman's Own Story. As to the story of Sherman's insanity, the General himself gives this account in his Memoirs:

"About this time, say, the middle of October, I received notice by telegraph that the Secretary of War, Mr. Cameron (then in St. Louis) would visit me at Louisville on his way back to Washington. I was delighted to have an opportunity to properly represent the actual state of affairs, and got Mr. Guthrie to go with me across to Jeffersonville to meet the Secretary of War and escort him to Louisville. The train was behind time, but Mr. Guthrie and I waited until it actually arrived. Mr. Cameron was attended by Adj.-Gen. Lorenzo Thomas and six or seven gentlemen, who turned out to be newspaper reporters. Mr. Cameron's first inquiry was when he could start for Cincinnati, saying that as he had been detained at St. Louis so long it was important he should hurry on to Washington. I explained that the regular mail-boat would leave very late, viz. at 12 m.—but I begged him to come over to Louisville; that I wanted to see him on business as im-



GEN. SPEED S. FRY.


portant as any in Washington, and hoped he would come and spend at least a day with us. He asked if everything was not well with us, and I told him far from it; that things were actually bad, as bad as bad could be. This seemed to surprise him, and Mr. Guthrie added his persuasion to mine, while Mr. Cameron, learning that he could leave Louisville by rail via Frankfort next morning early, and make the trip to Cincinnati, contented with the distinct understanding that he must leave early the next morning for Washington.

"We accordingly all took hacks,



and we find a letter from Capt. A. Q. M. Dickinson, at Cincinnati, to Gen. Thomas, stating that he had begun the shipment of wagons to him but had hardly gotten under way when he received imperative orders to send 400 at once to Western Virginia, which nearly stripped him of vehicles.

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Personal Experiences in the United States and the Confederate States Armies.


By Lieut.-Gen. J. B. HOOD, C. S. A.

VI. The Dispute Between Gen. Johnston and Gen. Johnston. Gen. Johnston had more than 70,000 at the beginning of the Atlanta Campaign, and lost more than 20,000. Army Strong Enough to Have Battered Sherman if Handled Skillfully.

I very much regret I should find it incumbent upon me to discuss at this hour certain operations in the West; but most unjust strictures, passed upon me by Gen. Johnston, and which are derogatory to my character, alike as a man and a soldier, compel me to speak in self-defense, or otherwise admit by silence the charges brought forth.

Although I feel by reason of injustice done me in the past that I have good cause to demand of our people the privilege of a hearing upon certain matters little understood by them, I would, nevertheless, have left the work of vindication to the unbiased historian of the future, had not my words and actions been so strangely misrepresented.

Before and just after the close of



MAP OF THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

the war our people, in the despair of defeat, were in no state of mind to listen to truth which ran counter to their prejudices. Blind passion, however, has now subsided, and reason, it is hoped, has returned. I therefore solicit a hearing upon the subject of some of the most important historical events recounted by Gen. Johnston, and in which I was a prominent actor.

In his Narrative Gen. Johnston speaks as follows, pages 353-54:

"Gen. Hood in his report of his own disastrous operations accused me of gross official misstatements of the strength of the army and of its losses—asserting that I had 'at and near Dalton' an available force of 75,000 men, and that 22,500 of them were lost in the campaign, including 7,000 prisoners. He recklessly appealed for the truth of these assertions to Maj. Kinloch Falconer, Assistant Adjutant-General, by whom the returns of the army were made, which were my authority for the statement attacked by Gen. Hood. At my request, made in consequence of this attack, Maj. Falconer made another statement from the data in his possession, which contradicted the appellant. By that statement the effective strength of the army 'at and near Dalton' was 40,484 infantry and artillery and 2,380 cavalry."

Furthermore, page 358, he says: "The loss of the Confederate army in this campaign, while under my command, was 9,972 killed and wounded."

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in the Confederate States Senate, but who, owing to his intense enmity to President Davis, allowed himself to be governed by undue influences. Gen. Wigfall was virtually the political Chief of Staff of Gen. Johnston, and, considering the close relations of these gentlemen, a statement from him relative to the strength of the army at that period may safely be regarded as good authority. This Senator, in a speech directed against President Davis and myself, in the Confederate States Senate, asserted that "New Hope Church he (Johnston) had of all arms 64,000; of these 8,000 were cavalry, supposing it not to have increased by recruiting up to that time; that gives him 56,000 infantry and artillery. There must be a mistake in respect to this arm of the service. It should be borne in mind that Gen. Johnston reports, in accordance with Maj. Falconer's statement, on the 1st of May, and previous to Gen. Sherman's advance, only 2,382 cavalry, and that no other return was made up until the 16th of June, when the army was near Kennesaw Mountain—40 days in the interim having elapsed. Field returns are made up from the returns of corps commanders, and may be called for every 16 days, or every month or two, as the Commanding General may deem proper. It does not follow, however, that



GEN. JOSEPH WHEELER.

commanders of corps, divisions, brigades and regiments neglect to make up their returns every few days. In fact, it is well known that this duty is neglected by no direct officer, even during an active campaign; otherwise there would be no means of ascertaining the number of men engaged in any one battle. The return of Maj. Falconer, I presume, is correct so far as it gives the effective strength of the cavalry directly at Dalton on the 1st of May; but it does not include the brigades "near Dalton," "within the easy direction" of Gen. Johnston, as shown by the following extract from the official return now in the possession of Maj.-Gen. Wheeler, a copy of which this officer furnished me on the 2d of May, 1874:

"May 6, 1864. General field and staff and company officers present, 525; total effective fighting force, 4,299; aggregated officers and men, 4,824. Dobbrell and Harrison joined from East Tennessee with 1,415 effective men just after this report was made. Dobbrell and Harrison, readied Resaca about May 1. I went down and inspected the command."

This aggregate gives a total effective of 6,239, and it is evident that Gen. Johnston's Chief of Cavalry, Maj. Joseph Wheeler, had in his command this number "at and near Dalton," not only on the 6th, but on the 1st of May. Gen. Johnston himself furnishes proof of the correctness of Maj.-Gen. Wheeler's report of the 6th, by his acknowledgment of the presence of Dobbrell's Brigade on the 9th of May, in these words:

"On the same day Maj.-Gen. Wheeler, with Dobbrell's and Allen's Brigades, encountered a large body of Federal cavalry near Vandyke, Ga. He admits also Gen. Martin's Division of Cavalry to have been at Cartersville, a short distance south of Resaca, on the 6th of May, and Maj. Kinloch Falconer states in his official report: 'The cavalry of the Mississippi Army, which joined near Adairsville, was estimated at 3,900 effective men, and Martin's Cavalry Division, which joined near Resaca, at 3,500.' Let us, therefore, continue the search for cavalry, before returning to New Hope Church to make the first estimate of the effective strength of this army. Gen. Johnston, in his Narrative, alludes to the following accretions: 'Jackson's 3,900 met us at Adairsville on the 17th.' This number, added to Wheeler's and Martin's forces of 6,239, gives of this arm of the service an effective total of 10,139; which number, in lieu of 8,000 reported at New Hope Church, gives 66,139, instead of 64,000 of all arms, as stated by Gen. Wigfall."

The following letter from Maj.-Gen. Wheeler affords additional evidence of the correctness of the foregoing estimate of cavalry:

"New Orleans, La., June 1, 1866. 'Dear General: In reply to your inquiry as to the aggregate number of officers and enlisted men, mounted and dismounted, I could have thrown into action at any time prior to the siege of Atlanta, had I been notified that a battle was to be fought, and time given to bring up men detailed at the rear, I will state that the records in my possession show that upon the 10th day of July, 1864, the figures referred to were 8,410; of these 6,273 were fighting, enlisted men already on duty, mounted on serviceable horses. Gen. Jackson and three brigades which are not included in the above."

"I cannot give his exact force, but when he first joined the army near Adairsville I was informed he had about 4,500 men."

"I remain, General, with great respect, your obedient servant."

"(Signed) Joseph Wheeler."

"To Gen. John B. Hood, late Commanding Army of Tennessee."

Joe Johnston Had 70,000 Effectives. Thus, the first summary shows an effective total of 66,139 men, 13 days out from Dalton, to which force should be added 3,388 killed and wounded, a loss which Gen. Johnston acknowledges to have sustained prior to the passage of the Etowah, and the result shows a total army of 69,527 effectives "at and near Dalton," in this manner: I shall gradually trace the number of available troops, from which deduct the effective total turned over to me by Gen. Johnston on the 18th of July, and retained in that vicinity about 10 days previous to the retreat upon Pine and Kennesaw Mountains, near Marietta. It was here visited by Gen. L. T. Wigfall, a man of talent, and, at that time,

(Continued on page two.)